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METAPHYSICS, PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY;
PROFESSOR DEWEY'S VIEWS
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
FROM time immemorial, philosophy has bceii a compound of
which metaphysics, psycholog^y. logic, ethics a'l i theology formed
the ingredients, though in varying proportions. Professor John
Dewey, as we have seen, regards philosophy :is a branch of ethics,
in a sense, and as a body of propositions and principles peculiarly
fitted to plav the role of reconciler, interpreter, guide and purifier
of values. Philosophv is not. in Professor Dewey's opinion, a rival
of science : it must, indeed, follow science, and take care to assimilate
established scientific truths, in order to fulfill its own more general
and more synthetic function. Yet, surprisingly enough. Professor
Dewev's svstem of philosophy essays to correct and even revolution-
ize certain accepted propositions in more than one special science.
This shows perhaps that no school of philosophy can escape the
necessity of developing its own metaphysics, its own psychology and
its own logic. Be this as it may. however. Professor Dewev's views
on questions not strictlv philosophical by his own definitions and
delimitations are both arresting and important: they have influenced
and continue to influence students of philosophy and metaphysics,
and they are vital to the body of doctrines known as Pragmatism.
Let us begin with the so-called fundamental question as to "the
stuff of the universe." Is this ultimate stuff material or psychical ?
Libraries have been filled up with volumes in which attempts have
been made to answer this question. Professor Dewey and his school
start by analyzing the question itself. How does it occur at all? What
facts in nature and in human activity give rise to it?
To quote Professor Dewey :
"The vague and mysterious properties assigned to mind and mat-
ter, the very conceptions of mind and matter in traditional thought.
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are ghosts walking underground.
. . .
The matter of science is a
character of natural events, and changes as they change. Natural
events are so complex and varied that there is nothing surprising
in their possession of dififerent characterizations, characters so dif-
ferent that they can easily be treated as opposites. Nothing but un-
familiarity stands in the way of thinking of both mind and matter as
different characters of natural events, in which matter expresses
their sequential order and mind the order of their meanings in their
logical connections and dependencies. . . .
"That to which both mind and matter belong is the complex of
events that constitute nature."
Of course, there is a process which we call thinking and opera-
tions we call mental. But "thinking is no different in kind from the
use of natural materials and energies, say fire and tools, to refine,
reorder and shape other natural materials, say ore." At no point or
place is there any jump outside empirical, natural objects and their
relations. "Thought and reason are not specific powers. They con-
sist of the procedures intentionally employed in the application to
each other of the unsatisfactorily confused and indeterminate, on
the one hand, and the regular and stable on the other. ..."
"The idea that matter, life and mind represent separate kinds of
Being springs from a substantiation of eventual functions. The
fallacy converts consequences of interaction of events into causes
of the occurrence of these consequences. ..."
In short, mind and matter are not static structures, but functional
characters, and the distinctions between physical, psycho-physical
and mental is one of levels of increasing complexity and intimacy
of interaction among natural events."
It is hardly necessary to point out that modern science fully sup-
ports Professor Dewey's characterization of matter and of mind.
And, as he observes, and as Spencer observed long ago, the quarrel
between materialists and spiritualists has absolutely no meaning. We
are getting rid of unreal problems, of problems created by arbitrary
distinctions and misleading terms of our own invention, and the
sooner philosophy and theology follow the example of science in
dropping empty dialectics and attacking real problems, the better for
their influence and for human progress.
In dealmg with another ancient and troublesome question,
namely, the "paralellism" of external and internal events, the rela-
tion of the brain to thinking, the mystery of what we call conscious-
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ness of self and others. Professor Dewey is equally felicitous and
convincing.
Not that he denies the existence of "mystery," or that he claims
that science has explained or can explain everything in nature. He
says: "The wonder and mystery do not seem to be other than the
wonder and mvstery that there should be such a thing as nature, as
existential events, at all, and that in being they should be what they
are. The wonder should be transferred to the whole course of
things. . . . Since mind cannot evolve except where there is an
organized process in which the fulfillments of the past are conserved
and employed, it is not surprising that mind, when it evolves, should
be mindful of the past and future, and that it should use the struc-
tures which are biological adaptations of organism and environment
as its own and only organs. In ultimate analysis, the mystery that
mind should use a body, or that a body should have a mind, is like
the mystery that a man cultivating plants should use a soil, or that
the soil that grows plants at all should grow those adapted to its own
physico-chemical properties and lelations."
The world is what it is. Mind has developed in it, just as lite
has developed in it. Tt is arbitrary to separate life from nature,
mind from organic life, and then marvel at the mysteries of their
union. Rational advance, says Professor Dewey, or recovery from
present confusion and madness, "depends upon seeing and using
these specifiable things as links functionally significant in a process.
To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism,
the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer
to the problems which haunt philosophy."
We may observe here that Professor Dewey would not object to
purely scientific, experimental efiforts to ascertain just what change,
addition or readjustment and recombination convert what we call
dead matter into living tissue, for example, or to ascertain all the
conditions under which the mystery called "thinking" takes place,
and exactly where it takes place. His position is that philosophy,
as such, is not concerned with such problems, any more than it is
concerned with the question of diminishing returns in agriculture
or with the soundness of the quantitative theory of money.
The question of the reality or function of "consciousness" is
naturally discussed in connection with the bodv-mind organism which
nature has evolved in man and which in turn observes nature, accom-
modates itself to the environment and, when possible, modifies en-
vironmental factors to suit its realized needs and interests.
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Professor Dewey doe not waste time, space or ingenuity in deal-
ing with verbal objections or prejudices against old terms charged
with theological or unscientific connotations. Thus he finds use
even for the term "soul," and his definition of that word should be
quite acceptable to irreconcilable Agnostics. The term conscious-
ness has wrought much mischief in psychology, but Professor Dewey
would not outlaw it on that account. He insists, however, on a very
careful definition of it. His own definition is as lucid as it is ade-
quate. "Consciousness in a being with language," he says, "denotes
awareness or perception of meanings ; it is the perception of actual
events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their meanings
—
the having of actual ideas." The field of mind is enormously wider,
of course, than that of consciousness ; "mind is, so to speak, struc-
tural, substantial, a constant background and foreground
;
percep-
tive consciousness is process, a series of heres and nows. . . . Con-
sciousness is, as it were, the occasional interception of messages con-
tinually transmitted, as a mechanical receiving device selects a few
of the vibrations with which the air is filled and renders them aud-
ible." "Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of mean-
ings which at a given time is undergoing redirection, transitive trans-
formation. . . . Consciousness is the meaning of events in course
of remaking ; its 'cause' is only the fact that this is one of the ways
in which nature goes on."
The attempt to separate consciousness into two phases. Profes-
sor Dewey regards as futile. "Immediate consciousness, he says,
cannot be described, not because of any mystery behind it, but be-
cause "it is something bad, not communicated and known." We
cannot tell what consciousness is. but thanks to speech, a thing had
may be had in a particularly illuminating way. Because of words,
consciousness is focalization of meanings. We become aware of
relations of the thing had to other things and other events. Con-
sciousness is not an entity which makes differences ; it is the differ-
ence that is in the process of making, and that process is due to
awareness of new meanings, imperceived connections, mental dis-
coveries, the warnings and criticisms of others, self-criticism.
And what is it we are aware of when conscious? The distinc-
tion made between objects and events is valid enough, if not
stretched. Says Professor Dewey
:
"Objects are precisely what we are aware of. For objects are
events with meanings; tables, chairs, stars, the milky way, electrons,
ghosts, centaurs, historic epochs, and all the infinitely multifarious
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subject-matters of discourse designable by common nouns, verbs and
their qualifiers. . . .
"Events are present and operative any^i'oy : what concerns us is
their meanmgs expressed in expectations, beliefs, inferences regard-
ing their potentialities. . . . Events have effects or consequences,
and since meaning is awareness of these consequences before they
actually occur, reflective inquiry, which converts an event into an
object, is the same thing as finding out a meaning which the event
already possesses by imputation."
A mere shock is an event, but not an object, illustrates Profes-
sor Dewey. We have to interpret the shock, to assign a meaning to
it, to connect it with other events, and in doing all this we convert
the event into an object, a significant thing.
Why does Professor Dewey prefer the compound term "body-
mind"? Because, he answers, this term designates "an affair with
its own properties," and describes "what actually takes place when
a living body is implicated in situations of discourse, communica-
tion and participation. In the hyphenated phrase 'body-mind,' body
designates the continued and conserved, the registered and cumu-
lative operation of factors continuous with the rest of nature ; while
'mind' designates the characters and consequences which are dif-
ferential, indicative of features which emerge when 'body' is engaged
in a wider, more complex and interdependent situation."
The old notions of the independence of the mind, the seat of
ideas, and the like, must be abandoned. The body has much to do
with perception. Much of what has been accepted concerning alleged
"pure sensations," differences between peripheral and central origins
of perceptions, etc., is obsolete, and the trouble with psychology,
physiology and philosophy is that they continue to use a vocabulary
which is appropriate to intellectual hold-overs or survivals, but which
fails to express the conclusions of modern science.
It may be asked at this point what the foregoing observations
have to do with the essential business of philosophy. We have
already pointed out that we may accept all of Professor Dewey's
theories in psychology, logic and metaphysics without indorsing his
conception of philosophy. But it is only fair to recognize that Pro-
fessor Dewey himself asserts and repeatedly effects a connection
between his theories and propositions in other branches of knowl-
edge and his deliberate definition of philosophy. We may fitly con-
clude our elaborate—and yet far from adequate—review of a re-
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markable and significant work with a few quotations in which this
connection is tacitly made or implied.
Thus after giving reasons for rejecting the doctrine of parallelism
and the separation of body from mind, Professor Dewey says:
"If the problem is put as one of a more adequate control of be-
havior through knowledge of its mechanism, the situation becomes
very dififerent. How should we treat a particular meaning—as sound
datum for inference, as an effect of habit irrespective of present
condition, as an instance of desire, or a consequence of hope or fear,
a token of some past psycho-physical maladjustment, or how? Such
questions as these are urgent in the conduct of life. They are typical
of questions which we must find a way of answering if we are to
achieve any method of mastering our own behavior similar to that
which we have achieved in respect to heat and electricity, coal and
iron."
In discussing the distinction between events and objects, as de-
fined by him. Professor Dewey says
:
"Philosophy must explicitly note that the business of reflection is
to take events which brutally occur and brutally affect us—to con-
vert them into objects by means of inference as to their probable
consequences. These are the meanings imputed to the events under
consideration. Otherwise philosophy finds itself in a hopeless im-
passe. . . . Philosophy has only to state, to make explicit, the dif-
ference between events which are challenges to thought and events
which have met the challenge and hence possess meaning. It has
only to note that bare occurrenfe in the way of having, being or
undergoing is the provocation and invitation to thought—seeking
and finding unapparent connections, so that thinking terminates
when an object is present: namely, when a challenging event is en-
dowed with stable meanings through relationship to something ex-
trinsic but connected."
Finally, in dealing with consciousness and resultant action, or the
lack of appropriate, beneficial action when it might be expected to
follow. Professor Dewey writes
:
"We have at present little or next to no controlled art of secur-
ing that redirection of behavior which constitutes adequate percep-
tion or consciousness. That is, we have little or no art of education
in fundamentals—namely, in the management of the organic atti-
tudes which color the qualities of our conscious objects and acts."
"The world seems made in preoccupation with what is specific,
particular, disconnected in medicine, politics, science, industry, edu-
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cation. In terms of a conscious control of inclusive wholes search
for those links which occupy key positions and efifect critical con-
nections is mdispensable." . . .
"Clearly, we have not carried the plane of conscious control, tht
direction of action by perception of connections, far enough. Wt
cannot separate organic life and mind from physical nature without
also separating nature from life and mind. The separation has
reached a point where intelligent persons are asking whether the end
is to be catastrophe, the subjection of man to the industrial and
military machines he has created."
The foregoing paragraphs make the claim that a true conception
of philosophy and a correct understanding of the operations of the
"body-mind" constitute not merely the beginning of wisdom, but
also the first long step toward a rational and harmonious human
society. Obviously, this claim grows out of a certain estimate of the
role of intelligence and reason. Professor Dewey, as we have seen,
promises no Golden Age, and does not overlook the influence of pas-
sion, of envy, of greed, of ambition, of fear and of antipathy in
human afifairs ; but he does believe that if we knew ourselves, un-
derstood the body-mind, made allowances for habits and bias, and
honestly endeavored to measure consequences and efifects of hasty
or impulsive acts, whether individual, group or national, many of
our grave problems, so fraught with mischief and woe, would yield
more readily to solutions in conformity with what we rightly call
our better nature.
